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Despite a large theoretical and empirical literature on public goods and common-pool 
resources, a systematic comparison of these two types of social dilemmas is lacking. In fact, 
there is some confusion about these two types of dilemma situations. As a result, they are 
often treated alike. In line with the theoretical literature, we argue that the degree of rivalry is 
the fundamental difference between the two games. Furthermore, we experimentally study 
behavior in a quadratic public good and a quadratic common-pool resource game with 
identical Pareto optimum but divergent interior Nash equilibria. The results show that 
participants clearly perceive the differences in rivalry. Aggregate behavior in both games 
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Despite the seminal papers by Musgrave (1959, 1969) and Samuelson (1954) and a large 
theoretical and empirical literature on social dilemmas in general, and public goods and 
common-pool resources in particular, it appears not to be generally accepted in the 
experimental/behavioral literature that both types of games are distinct. A typical example of 
a public good is national defense, while a typical example of a common-pool resource is a 
fishery. Clearly, while it is not possible to restrict the enjoyment of the former, the fish caught 
by one individual is not available to other users anymore.
1 This distinction has lead many 
authors to propose a categorization of goods on the basis of excludability and rivalry.
2 
According to the latter, a public good has two essential attributes: non-excludability and non-
rivalry in consumption. A common-pool resource, however, is non-excludable but rival. The 
possibility of non-rival consumption by multiple consumers is the major feature 
distinguishing public goods from common-pool resources. Non-excludability, that is, the 
difficulty of excluding non-paying consumers from consumption, is a feature that both types 
of goods share.  
 
Non-excludability, together with the fact that public goods and common-pool resources can 
be reduced to a prisoner’s dilemma game
3 (Ledyard 1995, Ostrom 1990, Gintis 2000, 
                                                 
1 There exist many empirical applications of the two concepts that demonstrate that the distinction is crucial for 
policy and institutional design (see for example Ostrom 1990, Seabright 1993, Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 
1994 or Cornes and Sandler 1996). Gaspart and Seki (2003) provide a good example for the two types of games 
describing a fishery. Typically fisheries are common-pool resources but the local fishery analyzed by them 
institutionally transforms this common-pool resource into a public good by equally distributing the catch among 
villagers after each day of fishing. 
2 Samuelson (1954) introduced the polar definition of private versus public goods based on their non-rivalry in 
consumption and Musgrave (1959, 1969) suggested the criterion of exclusion in addition to rivalry adding 
common-pool resources and club goods to the definition. See also Samuelson (1955) and Musgrave (1983) as 
well as for example Taylor (1987), Cornes and Sandler (1996), and Bowles (2003). 
3 Consider a game that belongs to the broad class of symmetric games with a symmetric Nash equilibrium, 
Pareto dominated by a different symmetric action profile that is not equilibrium. If one reduces such a game to a 
2 × 2 game where the symmetric Nash equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the alternative symmetric action 
profile, the latter not being a Nash equilibrium, then it is obvious that one gets the structure of a prisoner’s forthcoming in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 2006 
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Camerer 2003, Sandler and Arce 2003), have led many authors to treat both social dilemma 
games as equivalent. Among these authors are some that claim that both games are 
strategically equivalent (see e.g. Ledyard 1995, Gintis 2000, 257 and Camerer 2003, 45-46). 
Based on this belief the difference between public goods and common-pool resources has 
often been reduced to frames or different representations of one and the same game. From that 
perspective commons, resource or common-pool dilemmas are considered to be take-some 
frames of public good games, whereas the term public good is reserved for a give-some frame 
of the same game
4 (see e.g. Brewer and Kramer 1986, Fleishman 1988, van Dijk and Wilke 
1995, McCusker and Carnevale 1995, Sell and Son 1997, Elliot and Hayward 1998, van Dijk, 
Wilke, Wilke and Metmann 1999, and van Dijk and Wilke 2000). In summary, there is a 
literature that claims that common-pool resources and public goods are the same, and 




An explicit example of this is provided by Gintis (2000, 257-258), who writes: “While 
common pool resource and public goods games are equivalent for Homo Oeconomicus, 
people treat them quite differently in practice. This is because the status quo in the public 
goods game is the individual keeping all the money in the private account, while the status 
quo in the common pool resource game is that the resource is not being used at all. This is a 
good example of a framing effect, since people measure movements from the status quo and 
                                                                                                                                                          
dilemma game. Clearly, symmetric common-pool resource games and public good games belong to the above 
mentioned class of games. Note also that symmetric Cournot games, and Bertrand games also belong to this 
class of games. 
4 A give-some frame presents the dilemma situation as one in which individually owned resources have to be 
contributed to a common undertaking, whereas in a take-some frame the dilemma consists in leaving resources 
in the common undertaking. For an experimental analysis of give-some and take-some framing effects in a 
public good environment see Andreoni (1995a), Sonnemans, Schram and Offerman (1998), Willinger and 
Ziegelmeyer (1999), or Park (2000). 
5 Note that different labels may not be problematic as long as authors are aware of the difference and explicitly 
state that identical labels are used for different games.  forthcoming in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 2006 
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hence tend to undercontribute in the public goods game and overcontribute (underexploit) in 
the common pool resource game, compared to the social optimum.”  
 
In this paper we first establish theoretically that public good and common-pool resource 
games as used in the experimental literature are two distinct types of social dilemmas. We 
show that the distinguishing feature of these two types of games lies in the distributional 
factor that determines whether the good is rival or non-rival. This difference gives rise to two 
distinct strategic environments. Based on these theoretical differences we devise an 
experiment that tests whether the theoretical differences have an impact on behavior in the 
two games. That is, our aim is to assess whether the theoretical difference between the two 
types of goods also has behavioral implications. For that purpose, we contrast a quadratic 
public good game with interior Nash equilibrium (see, e.g., Chan, Mestelman, Moir and 
Muller 1996, Sefton and Steinberg 1996, Isaac and Walker 1998 and Laury, Walker, and 
Williams 1999), with a standard common-pool resource game (see, e.g., Ostrom, Gardner, 
and Walker 1994, Keser and Gardner 1999, Beckenkamp 2002, and Casari and Plott 2003). 
We chose parameters in which the differences between the two types of games are reduced to 
a minimum. First, to guarantee that the structural differences between the two games cannot 
be attributed to framing, both games are framed as give-some games. Second, the Pareto 
solutions in both games are identical in terms of actions and payoffs, third, the symmetric 
interior Nash predictions are located at symmetric points from the extremes of the individual 
action space and involve the same payoffs. The experimental results clearly show that starting 
from cooperative levels, aggregate behavior in both games tends to the respective Nash 
equilibrium. This clearly indicates that the differences in rivalry affect behavior, strengthening 
the importance of differentiating between the two types of goods. 
 forthcoming in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 2006 
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The paper is organized as follows. The first subsection of section two introduces the typical 
public good and common-pool resource games found in the experimental literature. The 
second subsection discusses the role of rivalry as the distinguishing feature between public 
goods and common-pool resource games in a general setting. Section 3 discusses the 
experimental design. In section 4 the experimental findings are presented, and section 5 
concludes with a discussion and summary. 
 
 forthcoming in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 2006 
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2.- PUBLIC GOODS AND COMMON-POOL RESOURCE GAMES 
 
2.1.- THE EXPERIMENTAL GAMES 
 
In this section we introduce two particular games that represent a public good and a common-
pool resource game. These games are taken from the experimental literature, and are the 
games that we will subsequently analyze experimentally. We also introduce a first theoretical 
comparison of the two games, showing that the distinguishing feature between both games is 
the degree of rivalry. 
A Public Good Game 
 
In the following we introduce a quadratic public good game with an interior symmetric Nash 
equilibrium. We concentrate on such a class of public good games because common-pool 
resource games are typically characterized by an interior Nash equilibrium. Since we are 
interested in the role of rivalry as the critical difference between the two types of games, we 
keep the differences between the two games as minimal as possible. 
 
The following formulation draws from Isaac and Walker (1998).
6 There are n identical 
players, N = {1,…,n}, each one with an endowment of e ∈ ℜ++. Each player i must decide 
how much to invest in the public good y, xi ∈ [0,e]. The level of the public good is 
determined according to the technology  
                                                 
6 For other formulations of quadratic public good games with interior Nash equilibria see Sefton and Steinberg 
(1996) (in their NE treatment), Chan, Mestelman, Moir and Muller (1996) and Laury, Walker and Williams 
(1999). Keser (1996), Sefton and Steinberg (1996) (in their DE treatment), Willinger and Ziegelmeyer (1999, 
2001) and Falkinger, Fehr, Gächter and Winter-Ebmer (2000) study public good games with a unique interior 
dominant strategy equilibrium by making the private account quadratic. Although this manipulation resulted in a 
quadratic payoff function, the underlying public good remained linear. Quadratic public good games without 
interior Nash equilibrium have been analyzed by Issac and Walker (1991) and Isaac, McCue and Plott (1985). forthcoming in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 2006 
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y = g(x) = [aΣh∈N xh -b(Σh∈N xh)
2] ( 1 / n )       ( 1 )  
 
where x ∈ [0,e]
n. All resources not invested in the public good are allocated to a private 
account with a constant marginal return c. Hence, individual i’s payoff function is given by  
 
 u i(x) = [aΣh∈N xh -b(Σh∈N xh)
2](1/n) + c(e- xi)        ( 2 )  
 
Individual i’s best-reply function is 
 
 x i
PG(x-i) = max {0, [(a-cn)/2b]-Σh≠ixh}       ( 3 )  
 




*PG = (a-cn)/2bn    for all i ∈  N        ( 4 )  
 
It is well known that applying the logic of backward induction to the finite repetition of the 
public good game results in (4) being also the unique symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium 
of the finitely repeated public good game.  
 
The unique symmetric Pareto solution of the public good game is obtained by optimizing 
Σh∈N uh(x) over Σh∈N xh  
 
 x i
PG-P = (a-c)/2bn    for all i ∈  N        ( 5 )  forthcoming in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 2006 
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A Common-Pool Resource Game 
 
The following is a standard formulation of a common-pool resource game that draws from 
Walker, Gardner and Ostrom (1990).
7 Denote by i ∈ N= {1,...,n} the i-th player in the CPR 
game that is endowed with e ∈ ℜ++, and has to decide how much of his or her endowment to 
allocate to the common-pool resource xi ∈ [0,e]. Player i’s payoff for the resources allocated 
to the common-pool are represented by  
 
 h(x)(xi/Σh∈N xh) = [aΣh∈N xh -b(Σh∈N xh)
2](xi/Σh∈N xh)       ( 6 )  
 
As in the case of the public good game, all resources not invested in the common-pool are 
allocated to a private account with a marginal return of c. Hence, player i’s total payoff 
function is 
 
 v i(x) = [aΣh∈N xh -b(Σh∈N xh)
2](xi/Σh∈N xh) + c(e- xi)      (7) 
 
Individual i’s best reply function, the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, and the unique 
symmetric Pareto solution in the common-pool resource game are respectively 
 
 x i
CP(x-i) = max {0, (1/2)[[(a-c)/b]-Σh≠I xh] }        ( 8 )  
 
                                                 
7 For other formulations of quadratic common-pool resource games see Clark (1980), Walker and Gardner 
(1992), Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (1994), Herr, Gardner, and Walker (1997), Beckenkamp and Ostmann 
(1999), Keser and Gardner (1999), Walker, Gardner, Herr, and Ostrom (2000), Beckenkamp (2002), Casari and 
Plott (2003), Margreiter, Sutter and Dietrich (2005) and Apesteguia (forthcoming). In the psychological 
literature common-pool resource games are generally implemented as linear threshold CPRs alternatively known 
as Nash demand games. See for example Suleiman and Rapoport (1988), Budescu, Rappoport and Suleiman 
(1995), Budescu and Au (2002). There also exist experimental CPR studies in non-strategic, decision-theoretic 
environments (see e.g. Hey, Neugebauer and Sadrieh 2004). forthcoming in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 2006 
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 x i
*CP = (a-c)/b(n+1)    for all i ∈  N        ( 9 )  
 
 x i
CP-P = (a-c)/2bn    for all i ∈  N        ( 1 0 )  
 
Note that the symmetric Pareto solution is the same in both games. Table 1 gives the 
theoretical predictions for the public good and common-pool resource games for the 
parameters used in the experimental study. 
 
Table1: Experimental parameters and theoretical benchmarks* 
  Nash equilibrium  Pareto solution 




public  good  20 180  50 225 
common-pool 
resource 
80 180  50 225 
* The parameters used in the experimental study are: n = 4, a = 6, b = .0125, c = 1, e = 100 
 
The values of the parameters were chosen so that: (i) all predictions are in integer numbers, 
(ii) payoffs from playing the symmetric Nash equilibria are the same in both games, and, 
since the symmetric Pareto solution is the same for both games, the gain in efficiency 
associated with a switch from Nash equilibrium to the Pareto solution is also the same in both 
games (an increase in payoffs of 20%), and (iii) the symmetric Nash predictions in the public 
good and common-pool resource games are located at symmetric points from the extremes of 
the individual strategy space.  
 forthcoming in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 2006 
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Figure 1 draws the best reply functions in both games, together with the Pareto reply function, 
common to both games. It displays the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in the CPR game, 
as well as the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in the PG game at the intersections of the 
respective best reply functions with the symmetry line. In addition the figure shows the 
symmetric Pareto efficient allocation for both games at the intersection of the symmetry line 
with the individual Pareto reply function.  
 
Public Good versus Common-Pool Resource Games 
 
The only difference between the two games is reflected in equations (1) and (6). Equation (1), 
the individual payoff function from allocations to the public good, reflects the non-rivalry 
property of public goods. The payoffs derived from the public good on the part of a player do forthcoming in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 2006 
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not reduce the payoffs derived from the other players. In other words, for any x ∈ [0,e]
n, all i 
∈ N have exactly the same payoff from the public good. 
 
On the other hand, equation (6), the individual payoff function from allocations to the 
common-pool, captures the rivalry property by introducing an individual distributional factor 
(xi/Σh∈N xh).
8 In this case xi/Σh∈N xh represents a proportional distribution. The higher xi in 
relation to Σh∈Nxh, the higher the appropriation of i from the common-pool resource. 
Therefore, in the case of the common-pool, the returns from the contributions of all players 
[aΣh∈N xh - b(Σh∈N xh)
2] are fully distributed to the individual players on the basis of the 
individual distributional factor (xi/Σh∈N xh). That is, the units from the common-pool 
consumed by player i are not available anymore to any other player j ≠ i. 
 
2.2- The Role of Rivalry  
 
Section 2.1 introduced two particular games, a quadratic public good game and a common-
pool resource game that we will subsequently study experimentally. The preceding section 
also pointed to the differences between the two types of social dilemmas. In the following we 
introduce general definitions of public good and common-pool resource games. In these 
general definitions we do not impose any restriction on symmetry, nor on the production 
functions from the public good, the common-pool, and the private accounts. The only 
assumption we make concerns the individual distributional factor from the common-pool. We 
will assume a proportional distributional factor, although we do not restrict it to a symmetric 
distributional factor. Of course, other distributional factors could be (and in fact sometimes 
                                                 
8 The term distributional factor is used to distinguish it clearly from institutional arrangements designed to 
manage a particular resource. From that perspective terms such as appropriation rule or sharing rule, often found 
in the literature, may be a misleading term to describe properties of the good. forthcoming in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 2006 
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are) used.
9 Then, by restricting the classes of possible public good and the common-pool 
resource games we show that these two types of games cannot be taken in general to be equal, 
and hence they are fundamentally different. 
 
We introduce the following notation. The set N = {1,…,n}, n ≥ 2, is the set of players, 
indexed by i, Xi = [0,ei] is player i’s strategy space, ei ∈ ℜ++, xi ∈ Xi, X = X1×⋅⋅⋅×Xn, and x = 
(x1,..., xn) ∈ X. 
 
Definition 1 (Public Good Game): Denote by Γ1 = (N,X,U) the public good game where the 
sets N and X are defined as above, and U = U1×⋅⋅⋅×Un, where Ui : X → ℜ is the payoff 
function of player i that is decomposed into functions G : X → ℜ (the public good production 
function) and Ci : Xi → ℜ (the private account payoff function), according to Ui(x) = G(x) + 
Ci(xi). 
 
Definition 2 (Common-Pool Resource Game): Denote by Γ2 = (N,X,V) the common-pool 
resource game where the sets N and X are defined as above, and V = V1×⋅⋅⋅×Vn, where Vi : X 
→ ℜ is player i’s payoff function that is decomposed into functions H : X → ℜ (the 
aggregated common-pool production function) and Di : Xi → ℜ (the private account payoff 
function), according to Vi(x) = H(x)(αixi/Σh∈N αhxh) + Di(xi), Σiαi = 1, and αi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N. 
 
Proposition 1: There is no configuration of functions G, Ci, H, and Di, such that Γ1 ≡ Γ2. 
 
                                                 
9 For a detailed discussion of different distributional factors and their consequences for the type of game, see 
Beckenkamp (forthcoming) and Rapoport and Amaldoss (1999). Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport (forthcoming) 
conducted an experimental study of a proportional and an egalitarian distributional factor in an inter-group 
competition game based on a linear public good. forthcoming in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 2006 
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Proof: To show that in general Γ1 ≡ Γ2 does not hold, we only need to find a domain where 
such identity cannot hold. For simplicity, we do this by restricting ourselves to the classes of 
CPR and PG games were the private accounts are linear, the aggregated common-pool 
production function is strictly concave in Σh∈N xh, and αi = αj for every i,j ∈ N. Now, assume, 
by way of contradiction, that there exist G(x), Ci(xi), H(x), and Di(xi) such that Ui(x) ≡ Vi(x) 
for all i ∈ N, and for all x ∈ X. Then, take any x ∈ X and i, j ∈ N, i ≠ j with xi ≠ xj. Hence, 
Ui(x) ≡ Vi(x) and Uj(x) ≡ Vj(x) for all x ∈ X imply that 
 
  G(x) = H(x)(xi/Σh∈N xh)+[Di(xi) – Ci(xi) ]        ( 1 1 )  
 
  G(x) = H(x)(xj/Σh∈N xh)+[Dj(xj) – Cj(xj) ]        ( 1 2 )  
 
Setting (11) and (12) equal and solving for H(x), one gets 
 
H(x)((xi – xj)/Σh∈N xh) = [Dj(xj) – Di(xi)] – [Cj(xj) – Ci(xi) ]       ( 1 3 )  
 
Now, since Dh and Ch are assumed to be linear, let Dh(xh) = a +bxh and Ch(xh) = c +dxh, where 
a,b,c, and d are real value parameters. Hence, (13) implies that 
 
  H(x) = (d-b) Σh∈N xh 
 
which contradicts our initial assumption on the strict concavity of the aggregated common-
pool production function. 
           Q.E.D. 
 forthcoming in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 2006 
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The proof of Proposition 1 shows that public good and common-pool resource games cannot 
be taken in general as identical social dilemma games by restricting the production function of 
the CPR game to be concave, and the private accounts to be linear. Clearly, such classes of 
public good and the common-pool resource games are considerably broad since they 
encompass the class of experimental games studied in this paper, the standard and intensively 
studied linear public good games, and the standard CPR experimental games. 
 forthcoming in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 2006 
  16
3.- EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
The experiments were conducted at the Experimental Economics Laboratory at the University 
of Bonn using the z-Tree software developed by Fischbacher (1999). At the beginning of each 
session participants were randomly assigned to one of the 16 computer terminals. Before the 
session started, participants first had to read the instructions. In order to check if participants 
understood the instructions, three test questions were given.
10 The values used in the test 
questions were publicly drawn by randomly chosen participants from two urns
11 and 
announced. The experiment was started only once all participants had correctly answered all 
test questions.  
 
We ran two sessions for each game, for a total of 8 independent observations respectively. In 
each session 16 participants were randomly divided into groups of 4 to play a give-some 
frame of either the CPR or the PG game for 20 periods.
12 Participants knew that they would 
remain in the same group for 20 periods but they did not know with whom they were playing. 
At the end of each turn, participants received information on their decision, aggregate 
decisions of all other players, the payoffs from Account 1 (the common-pool or public good 
account) and 2 (the private account), the sum of the payoffs from both accounts in that period, 
and their total payoff so far. The parameterization of the PG game based on the payoff 
function (2) was: 
 
 u i(x) = [6Σh∈N xh – (1/80)(Σh∈N xh)
2](1/4) + (100 - xi)     (14) 
                                                 
10 Both the instructions and the test questions are available at http://www.yale.edu/unsy/jcr/jcrdata.htm. 
11 One urn contained all entries of the Y column of the total payoff table and the other contained all values of the 
X row. Even though participants were equipped with calculators, the numbers were chosen such that the test 
questions could be answered based on the entries in the tables provided. 
12 The non-random matching protocol, where group membership remains fixed across periods, was chosen 
although potential repeated game effects may interact with the inherent strategic differences of the two games, in forthcoming in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 2006 
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The parameterization of the CPR game based on the payoff function (7) was: 
 
 v i(x) = [6Σh∈N xh – (1/80)(Σh∈N xh)
2](xi/Σh∈N xh) + (100 - xi)    (15) 
 
Communication was not allowed throughout the experiment. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
order to have a sufficient number of independent observations. See section 4.2. for an analysis of sequential 




We begin by addressing the main question investigated in this paper, namely, whether the 
investment level in PG games significantly differs from the investment level in CPR games. 
Table 2 reports summary statistics on average investments for the entire experiment, as well 
as for the first and the second half. Also, the average payoffs, the standard deviations of the 
average allocations in the eight groups, and the average of the standard deviations at the 
individual level, are reported in the table. 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
 PG  CPR 
Average allocation (periods 1 to 20)  21.4  74.8 
Average allocation (periods 1 to 10)  23.3  72.2 
Average allocation (periods 11 to 20)  19.5  77.4 
Average payoffs  179.4  189.3 
Standard deviation of average allocations  4.0  3.6 
Average of standard deviation of individual behavior  21.7  20.4 
 
Result 1: Aggregate investment in the PG game is statistically different from investment in 
the CPR game. 
 
Support to Result 1: The permutation test on the basis of the average allocations per group 
yields a significance of 0.01% (two-sided).
13 Further, consider Figure 2 where the time series 
                                                 
13 See Siegel and Castellan (1988) for a reference on the statistical tests used in this paper.  forthcoming in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 2006 
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of average allocations per treatment are shown, and Figure 3 where the histogram of all 
individual decisions by treatment are reported.  
 
Clearly, investment decisions in both games sharply differ. This indicates that players are 
sensitive to the different incentive structures determined by the distributional factor. 
 







































Having shown that investment decisions differ between games, it remains to be shown 
whether the pattern of behavior exhibited by players also differs between games. The 
distinction between investment levels (investment decisions) and the pattern of behavior is 
important. Even though investment levels clearly differ, behavioral strategies may still be the 
same.  
 forthcoming in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 2006 
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Result 2: The pattern of behavior in both games is qualitatively similar. 
 
Support to Result 2: Figure 2 shows that aggregate allocations in both, PG and CPR games, 
start at levels in between the symmetric Pareto solution and the respective Nash equilibria, 
and tend to converge to the respective Nash equilibria. In fact, with respect to the tendency, 
average investment per group in the first half of the PG experiments are higher than those in 
the second half, while in the CPR experiments the relation is the opposite. The Wilcoxon 
signed-ranks test yields significance on the 0.0386 level for the PG case and on the 0.0039 
level for the CPR case (both one-sided). Furthermore, in both games, the null hypotheses of 
no difference between average allocations in the second half of the experiment at the group 
level with respect to the respective Nash equilibrium cannot be rejected at a 5% significance 
level. 
 
Figure 3: Histograms of individual investments in the PG and CPR experiments 
 




















It is illuminating that average payoffs in the CPR experiment do not significantly differ from 
those in the PG game. The permutation test does not reject at a 5% significance level the null 
hypothesis of equal average payoffs between the PG and CPR experiments. forthcoming in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 2006 
  21
 
However, this does not imply that behavior in CPR experiments is the mirror image of 
behavior in PG experiments. In fact, when contrasting the distribution of individual decisions 
between the PG experiments and the truncated distribution of the CPR experiments (that is, 
we take values yi, where yi = 100 - xi) the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test yields a 
significance on the .01 level.  
 
We conclude that participants in the experiments were sensitive to the unique difference 
between the two games: the degree of rivalry as captured by the distributional factor. Hence, it 
appears that not only that both types of games are theoretically and conceptually different, but 
that these differences are also reflected in different investment levels. Nevertheless, the 
pattern of behavior seems to be qualitatively similar when the Pareto solution and the Nash 
equilibrium are taken as reference points. 
 
4.1.- A LOOK AT INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 
 
So far the analysis was based on group level data. In this subsection we turn to individual 
behavior. It has consistently been shown that behavior at the individual level is very 
heterogeneous in dilemma experiments. To check for this regularity found in the literature, we 
compute for the respective game (equations (3) and (8)) the average of the squared differences 
between the observed data and the individual best-reply functions over all periods at the 
individual level. Figure 4 reports the distribution of the individual average squared 
differences. 
 forthcoming in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 2006 
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Figure 4: Histograms of individual average squared differences between observed data and 
best-reply predictions in the PG and CPR experiments 
 


















The range in Figure 4 goes from 0 to a maximum of 2500,
14 with 25 intervals of length 100. 
Note that the distributions in Figure 4 are quite dispersed. The mean deviation in the CPR 
(PG) experiments is 635.3 (839.5) with standard deviation 455.4 (462.1).  
 
Classifying individuals as best-repliers if they deviate 15% or less from the best reply in 
action space, about 20% of participants in the CPR experiments, and about 10% of 
participants in the PG experiments fall in that category. However, if we were to take players 
as exhibiting behavior substantially deviating from the best-reply when they deviate by 30% 
or more in action space
15 from the best-reply prediction, about 18% of the players in the CPR 
experiments, and about 25% in the PG experiments are characterized that way. Consequently, 
it appears that, consistent with previous findings, individual behavior in our experiments is 
quite diverse. 
                                                 
14 Note that if we take the individual decision and the best-reply prediction as uniform random variables, the 




4.2.- SEQUENTIAL DEPENDENCIES 
 
Our experimental games were conducted in partner design, that is, the same group of 
individuals interacted throughout the entire experiment. By doing so we adhered to the early 
experimental practice in both PG and CPR experiments, allowing us to gain a relatively high 
number of independent observations for the statistical analysis. A natural alternative to our 
design choice is to use random matching. Random matching has very important advantages 
since it minimizes reputation effects and other sequential dependencies. As a result, it is 
interesting to analyze to what extent sequential dependencies were present in our data. Of 
course, the ultimate test for such a question encompasses the comparison of experiments with 
and without random matching. Such a comparison is out of the scope of the present paper, but 
we can, nevertheless, make some tests in this respect.
16 
 
Individuals received feedback on the behavior of the opponents, in form of aggregate 
contributions in the group, throughout the experiment. In Figure 1 we showed that according 
to best-reply a negative relation between others’ allocations and one’s allocation should hold. 
On the other hand, a positive relation could indicate some kind of sequential dependency; for 
example a taste for conformity with the behavior of others.  
 
We measure such (first-order) dependencies by computing the Spearman rank-order 
correlation coefficient for each individual between the individual allocation decisions and the 
last observed sum of allocations of the opponents. Of the 32 individual coefficients in the PG 
                                                                                                                                                          
15 See the previous footnote. forthcoming in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 2006 
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(CPR) experiments 12 (19) were negative. A binomial test yields no difference at standard 
significance levels between the number of positive and negative coefficients in both 
experiments. That there is not a predominantly negative relation is not surprising given the 
remarkable deviations from best-reply that we could observe at the individual level in Figure 
3. Further, the no significance result suggests that (first-order) sequential dependencies 
between individuals seem not to be significantly present in our data. 
 
 
4.3.- RELATED LITERATURE 
 
Our experimental findings in the quadratic PG and the quadratic CPR game are generally in 
line with previous experimental evidence.  
 
The literature on quadratic public good games reports similar investment patterns to those 
observed here: behavior starts around the Pareto solution and then declines towards the Nash 
equilibrium with repetition. Interestingly, both (i) experimental studies of quadratic public 
good games where the interior Nash equilibrium is in dominant strategies (see Keser 1996, 
Falkinger, Fehr, Gächter, and Winter-Ebmer 2000, and Willinger and Ziegelmeryer 1999) and 
(ii) those without an interior Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies (see Isaac and Walker 
1998 and Laury, Walker and Williams 1999)
17 , show the mentioned pattern from Pareto to 
Nash, but at lower rates that those found here. That is, the convergence to Nash that we 
observe is quicker than the convergence reported in the literature. The determinants of such a 
                                                                                                                                                          
16 Botelho, Harrison, Costa Pino, and Rutström (2005) study these sort of questions in the context of public good 
games. 
17 See Anderson, Goeree and Holt (1998) for a theoretical discussion of these results. Laury and Holt 
(forthcoming) provide an overview of the PG literature with interior Nash equilibrium. For recent experimental 
studies of linear public good games see for example Maier-Rigaud, Martinsson and Staffiero (2005), Brandts and forthcoming in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 2006 
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difference are difficult to identify since there are many design differences between our 
experiments and those mentioned above.
18 However, this is an interesting observation that 
should be investigated in future research.
19  
 
For the CPR game, there is conflicting evidence on the tendency of aggregate decisions 
through time. This seems to depend on a variety of issues like the endowment, the group size, 
etc. Nevertheless, the general pattern of an increase of investment towards the Nash 
equilibrium has also been observed in the low endowment treatment in Walker, Gardner and 
Ostrom (1990), Ostrom and Walker (1991), Ostrom, Gardner and Walker (1994) and 
Apesteguia (forthcoming). Whereas, Keser and Gardner (1999), Gardner, Moore and Walker 
(1997), Walker, Gardner and Ostrom (1990) in the high endowment treatment, and Casari and 
Plott (2003), find investments above the Nash equilibrium. 
 
Inspired by the theoretical results of Rapoport and Amaldoss (1999), Gunnthorsdottir and 
Rapoport (forthcoming) study the two distributional factors analyzed here in the context of an 
inter-group competition game. The game within the group was a linear public good game with 
corner solution that determined the probability of winning a fixed award that afterwards was 
either split according to a proportional or an egalitarian distributional factor. The 
proportional distributional factor corresponds here to the CPR experiment, while the 
egalitarian distributional factor corresponds to the PG experiment. Although there are many 
differences in the design of their experiment and ours, their findings for the proportional 
                                                                                                                                                          
Schram (2001), Keser and van Winden (2000), Gächter and Fehr (1999), Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997), Andreoni 
(1995b), and Laury, Walker and Williams (1995). 
18 Charness, Frechette and Kagel (2004) have shown that payoff tables reduce cooperativeness in the context of 
gift exchange experiments. Gürerk and Selten (2006) find the opposite effect in the context of oligopoly 
experiments. In Laury, Walker and Williams (1999) conversion was quicker in the treatments with more detailed 
information containing payoff tables than in the treatments without. In our experiment conversion is even 
quicker than in their detailed information treatment. 
19 For an experimental study on the rates of convergence to equilibrium in 3 × 3 games see Ehrblatt Hyndman, 
Özbay and Schotter (2005). forthcoming in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 2006 
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distributional factor are similar to the pattern observed in the present CPR game. The main 
difference concerns the egalitarian distributional factor, where Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport 
found significantly higher contributions that only slowly converged to the Nash equilibrium in 




The aim of this study was to shed some light on the commonalities and differences between 
common-pool resources and public goods. We designed a public good and a CPR game with 
identical quadratic production function in order to compare both games on a theoretical and 
experimental level.  
 
We show that, in contradiction to the common belief that CPR and PG games are theoretically 
identical, the two games are in fact distinct games. We show that this difference is based on 
rivalry as captured by a proportional distributional factor.  
 
The experimental results clearly support the theoretical result that both games are different.  
Investment decisions in the public good experiments are statistically different to those in the 
common-pool resource ones. Given that both games were framed as give-some games, this 
difference can not be attributed to framing. Hence, the results clearly indicate that participants 
were sensitive to the rivalry structure of the strategic situation. Despite this difference 
reflecting the structure of the two games, there appear to be some behavioral similarities. In 
the CPR game the aggregate Nash equilibrium investment level is above the Pareto efficient 
one, whereas in the PG game the aggregate Nash equilibrium is below the Pareto efficient 
level. In both games, aggregate investment approaches the Nash equilibrium over time. At the 
beginning the Pareto optimum and later the Nash equilibrium appear to be behaviorally 
relevant. Aggregate behavior in both games is surprisingly similar in the sense that it starts in 
the neighborhood of the Pareto optimum and moves rather quickly to the respective aggregate 
Nash equilibrium.  forthcoming in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 2006 
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APPENDIX A: THE INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Instructions 
[[In both Games]]  
 
Welcome to this experiment! Please read the instructions carefully. Communication with other 
participants is strictly forbidden throughout the experiment. All participants have exactly the same 
instructions. You will be matched in groups of four persons. You will not be told who the other three 
persons in your group are. You will play for 20 periods with the same three persons.  
 
Decisions: In each period you will be provided with an endowment of 100 Taler. All other members of 
your group will also have an endowment of 100 Taler. 
In each period you will have to decide how to divide your endowment between two accounts.  
 
Account 1: You are allowed to invest in Account 1 any whole number X between 0 and 100. 
 
The payoffs you receive from Account 1 depend not only on the amount you invest in Account 1, but 
also on the investment decisions of the other 3 members of your group. You will find the payoff 
formula for Account 1 below. 
 
Account 2: After investing in Account 1, the remaining amount of Taler will automatically be invested 
in Account 2. 
 
In Account 2 the payoffs you receive depend only on your investment decision. Every Taler that you 
invest in Account 2 gives you a payoff of 1 Taler. Hence, if you invest X Taler in Account 1, you will 
invest (100-X) Taler in Account 2, and this will give you a payoff of (100-X) Taler in Account 2. 
 
Total payoffs: Your total payoffs per period are the sum of your payoffs in Account 1 plus your 
payoffs in Account 2. 
 
The following table describes your total payoffs (those of you interested in the payoff formula can find 
it below). 
The second row in the table shows different investment levels in Account 1 (in steps of 5) that you can 
choose (X). The second column shows different sums of the investment in Account 1 (in steps of 5) 
that the other 3 members of your group may choose (Y). The remaining entries show the total payoffs 
you earn if you choose the row level investment X (where X is the amount you invest into account 1) 
and the sum of the investment of the others is Y.  
In other words, the entry corresponding to column Y and row X indicates your payoffs in case your 
investment into account 1 is X and the sum of the investment of the others is Y. forthcoming in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 2006 
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[[In the Common-Pool Resource Game]]  
 
  Y                        
X    0  5  10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
 0  100,0 124,7 148,8 172,2 195,0 217,2 238,8 259,7 280,0 299,7 318,8 337,2 355,0 372,2 388,8 404,7 420,0 434,7 448,8 462,2 475,0 
 5  100,0 124,4 148,1 171,3 193,8 215,6 236,9 257,5 277,5 296,9 315,6 333,8 351,3 368,1 384,4 400,0 415,0 429,4 443,1 456,3 468,8 
 10  100,0 124,1 147,5 170,3 192,5 214,1 235,0 255,3 275,0 294,1 312,5 330,3 347,5 364,1 380,0 395,3 410,0 424,1 437,5 450,3 462,5 
 15  100,0 123,8 146,9 169,4 191,3 212,5 233,1 253,1 272,5 291,3 309,4 326,9 343,8 360,0 375,6 390,6 405,0 418,8 431,9 444,4 456,3 
 20  100,0 123,4 146,3 168,4 190,0 210,9 231,3 250,9 270,0 288,4 306,3 323,4 340,0 355,9 371,3 385,9 400,0 413,4 426,3 438,4 450,0 
 25  100,0 123,1 145,6 167,5 188,8 209,4 229,4 248,8 267,5 285,6 303,1 320,0 336,3 351,9 366,9 381,3 395,0 408,1 420,6 432,5 443,8 
 30  100,0 122,8 145,0 166,6 187,5 207,8 227,5 246,6 265,0 282,8 300,0 316,6 332,5 347,8 362,5 376,6 390,0 402,8 415,0 426,6 437,5 
 35  100,0 122,5 144,4 165,6 186,3 206,3 225,6 244,4 262,5 280,0 296,9 313,1 328,8 343,8 358,1 371,9 385,0 397,5 409,4 420,6 431,3 
 40  100,0 122,2 143,8 164,7 185,0 204,7 223,8 242,2 260,0 277,2 293,8 309,7 325,0 339,7 353,8 367,2 380,0 392,2 403,8 414,7 425,0 
 45  100,0 121,9 143,1 163,8 183,8 203,1 221,9 240,0 257,5 274,4 290,6 306,3 321,3 335,6 349,4 362,5 375,0 386,9 398,1 408,8 418,8 
 50  100,0 121,6 142,5 162,8 182,5 201,6 220,0 237,8 255,0 271,6 287,5 302,8 317,5 331,6 345,0 357,8 370,0 381,6 392,5 402,8 412,5 
 55  100,0 121,3 141,9 161,9 181,3 200,0 218,1 235,6 252,5 268,8 284,4 299,4 313,8 327,5 340,6 353,1 365,0 376,3 386,9 396,9 406,3 
 60  100,0 120,9 141,3 160,9 180,0 198,4 216,3 233,4 250,0 265,9 281,3 295,9 310,0 323,4 336,3 348,4 360,0 370,9 381,3 390,9 400,0 
 65  100,0 120,6 140,6 160,0 178,8 196,9 214,4 231,3 247,5 263,1 278,1 292,5 306,3 319,4 331,9 343,8 355,0 365,6 375,6 385,0 393,8 
 70  100,0 120,3 140,0 159,1 177,5 195,3 212,5 229,1 245,0 260,3 275,0 289,1 302,5 315,3 327,5 339,1 350,0 360,3 370,0 379,1 387,5 
 75  100,0 120,0 139,4 158,1 176,3 193,8 210,6 226,9 242,5 257,5 271,9 285,6 298,8 311,3 323,1 334,4 345,0 355,0 364,4 373,1 381,3 
 80  100,0 119,7 138,8 157,2 175,0 192,2 208,8 224,7 240,0 254,7 268,8 282,2 295,0 307,2 318,8 329,7 340,0 349,7 358,8 367,2 375,0 
 85  100,0 119,4 138,1 156,3 173,8 190,6 206,9 222,5 237,5 251,9 265,6 278,8 291,3 303,1 314,4 325,0 335,0 344,4 353,1 361,3 368,8 
 90  100,0 119,1 137,5 155,3 172,5 189,1 205,0 220,3 235,0 249,1 262,5 275,3 287,5 299,1 310,0 320,3 330,0 339,1 347,5 355,3 362,5 
 95  100,0 118,8 136,9 154,4 171,3 187,5 203,1 218,1 232,5 246,3 259,4 271,9 283,8 295,0 305,6 315,6 325,0 333,8 341,9 349,4 356,3 
 100  100,0 118,4 136,3 153,4 170,0 185,9 201,3 215,9 230,0 243,4 256,3 268,4 280,0 290,9 301,3 310,9 320,0 328,4 336,3 343,4 350,0 
 105  100,0 118,1 135,6 152,5 168,8 184,4 199,4 213,8 227,5 240,6 253,1 265,0 276,3 286,9 296,9 306,3 315,0 323,1 330,6 337,5 343,8 
 110  100,0 117,8 135,0 151,6 167,5 182,8 197,5 211,6 225,0 237,8 250,0 261,6 272,5 282,8 292,5 301,6 310,0 317,8 325,0 331,6 337,5 
 115  100,0 117,5 134,4 150,6 166,3 181,3 195,6 209,4 222,5 235,0 246,9 258,1 268,8 278,8 288,1 296,9 305,0 312,5 319,4 325,6 331,3 
 120  100,0 117,2 133,8 149,7 165,0 179,7 193,8 207,2 220,0 232,2 243,8 254,7 265,0 274,7 283,8 292,2 300,0 307,2 313,8 319,7 325,0 
 125  100,0 116,9 133,1 148,8 163,8 178,1 191,9 205,0 217,5 229,4 240,6 251,3 261,3 270,6 279,4 287,5 295,0 301,9 308,1 313,8 318,8 
 130  100,0 116,6 132,5 147,8 162,5 176,6 190,0 202,8 215,0 226,6 237,5 247,8 257,5 266,6 275,0 282,8 290,0 296,6 302,5 307,8 312,5 
 135  100,0 116,3 131,9 146,9 161,3 175,0 188,1 200,6 212,5 223,8 234,4 244,4 253,8 262,5 270,6 278,1 285,0 291,3 296,9 301,9 306,3 
 140  100,0 115,9 131,3 145,9 160,0 173,4 186,3 198,4 210,0 220,9 231,3 240,9 250,0 258,4 266,3 273,4 280,0 285,9 291,3 295,9 300,0 
 145  100,0 115,6 130,6 145,0 158,8 171,9 184,4 196,3 207,5 218,1 228,1 237,5 246,3 254,4 261,9 268,8 275,0 280,6 285,6 290,0 293,8 
 150  100,0 115,3 130,0 144,1 157,5 170,3 182,5 194,1 205,0 215,3 225,0 234,1 242,5 250,3 257,5 264,1 270,0 275,3 280,0 284,1 287,5 
 155  100,0 115,0 129,4 143,1 156,3 168,8 180,6 191,9 202,5 212,5 221,9 230,6 238,8 246,3 253,1 259,4 265,0 270,0 274,4 278,1 281,3 
 160  100,0 114,7 128,8 142,2 155,0 167,2 178,8 189,7 200,0 209,7 218,8 227,2 235,0 242,2 248,8 254,7 260,0 264,7 268,8 272,2 275,0 
 165  100,0 114,4 128,1 141,3 153,8 165,6 176,9 187,5 197,5 206,9 215,6 223,8 231,3 238,1 244,4 250,0 255,0 259,4 263,1 266,3 268,8 
 170  100,0 114,1 127,5 140,3 152,5 164,1 175,0 185,3 195,0 204,1 212,5 220,3 227,5 234,1 240,0 245,3 250,0 254,1 257,5 260,3 262,5 
 175  100,0 113,8 126,9 139,4 151,3 162,5 173,1 183,1 192,5 201,3 209,4 216,9 223,8 230,0 235,6 240,6 245,0 248,8 251,9 254,4 256,3 
 180  100,0 113,4 126,3 138,4 150,0 160,9 171,3 180,9 190,0 198,4 206,3 213,4 220,0 225,9 231,3 235,9 240,0 243,4 246,3 248,4 250,0 
 185  100,0 113,1 125,6 137,5 148,8 159,4 169,4 178,8 187,5 195,6 203,1 210,0 216,3 221,9 226,9 231,3 235,0 238,1 240,6 242,5 243,8 
 190  100,0 112,8 125,0 136,6 147,5 157,8 167,5 176,6 185,0 192,8 200,0 206,6 212,5 217,8 222,5 226,6 230,0 232,8 235,0 236,6 237,5 
 195  100,0 112,5 124,4 135,6 146,3 156,3 165,6 174,4 182,5 190,0 196,9 203,1 208,8 213,8 218,1 221,9 225,0 227,5 229,4 230,6 231,3 
 200  100,0 112,2 123,8 134,7 145,0 154,7 163,8 172,2 180,0 187,2 193,8 199,7 205,0 209,7 213,8 217,2 220,0 222,2 223,8 224,7 225,0 
 205  100,0 111,9 123,1 133,8 143,8 153,1 161,9 170,0 177,5 184,4 190,6 196,3 201,3 205,6 209,4 212,5 215,0 216,9 218,1 218,8 218,8 
 210  100,0 111,6 122,5 132,8 142,5 151,6 160,0 167,8 175,0 181,6 187,5 192,8 197,5 201,6 205,0 207,8 210,0 211,6 212,5 212,8 212,5 
 215  100,0 111,3 121,9 131,9 141,3 150,0 158,1 165,6 172,5 178,8 184,4 189,4 193,8 197,5 200,6 203,1 205,0 206,3 206,9 206,9 206,3 
 220  100,0 110,9 121,3 130,9 140,0 148,4 156,3 163,4 170,0 175,9 181,3 185,9 190,0 193,4 196,3 198,4 200,0 200,9 201,3 200,9 200,0 
 225  100,0 110,6 120,6 130,0 138,8 146,9 154,4 161,3 167,5 173,1 178,1 182,5 186,3 189,4 191,9 193,8 195,0 195,6 195,6 195,0 193,8 
 230  100,0 110,3 120,0 129,1 137,5 145,3 152,5 159,1 165,0 170,3 175,0 179,1 182,5 185,3 187,5 189,1 190,0 190,3 190,0 189,1 187,5 
 235  100,0 110,0 119,4 128,1 136,3 143,8 150,6 156,9 162,5 167,5 171,9 175,6 178,8 181,3 183,1 184,4 185,0 185,0 184,4 183,1 181,3 
 240  100,0 109,7 118,8 127,2 135,0 142,2 148,8 154,7 160,0 164,7 168,8 172,2 175,0 177,2 178,8 179,7 180,0 179,7 178,8 177,2 175,0 
 245  100,0 109,4 118,1 126,3 133,8 140,6 146,9 152,5 157,5 161,9 165,6 168,8 171,3 173,1 174,4 175,0 175,0 174,4 173,1 171,3 168,8 
 250  100,0 109,1 117,5 125,3 132,5 139,1 145,0 150,3 155,0 159,1 162,5 165,3 167,5 169,1 170,0 170,3 170,0 169,1 167,5 165,3 162,5 
 255  100,0 108,8 116,9 124,4 131,3 137,5 143,1 148,1 152,5 156,3 159,4 161,9 163,8 165,0 165,6 165,6 165,0 163,8 161,9 159,4 156,3 
 260  100,0 108,4 116,3 123,4 130,0 135,9 141,3 145,9 150,0 153,4 156,3 158,4 160,0 160,9 161,3 160,9 160,0 158,4 156,3 153,4 150,0 
 265  100,0 108,1 115,6 122,5 128,8 134,4 139,4 143,8 147,5 150,6 153,1 155,0 156,3 156,9 156,9 156,3 155,0 153,1 150,6 147,5 143,8 
 270  100,0 107,8 115,0 121,6 127,5 132,8 137,5 141,6 145,0 147,8 150,0 151,6 152,5 152,8 152,5 151,6 150,0 147,8 145,0 141,6 137,5 
 275  100,0 107,5 114,4 120,6 126,3 131,3 135,6 139,4 142,5 145,0 146,9 148,1 148,8 148,8 148,1 146,9 145,0 142,5 139,4 135,6 131,3 
 280  100,0 107,2 113,8 119,7 125,0 129,7 133,8 137,2 140,0 142,2 143,8 144,7 145,0 144,7 143,8 142,2 140,0 137,2 133,8 129,7 125,0 
 285  100,0 106,9 113,1 118,8 123,8 128,1 131,9 135,0 137,5 139,4 140,6 141,3 141,3 140,6 139,4 137,5 135,0 131,9 128,1 123,8 118,8 
 290  100,0 106,6 112,5 117,8 122,5 126,6 130,0 132,8 135,0 136,6 137,5 137,8 137,5 136,6 135,0 132,8 130,0 126,6 122,5 117,8 112,5 
 295  100,0 106,3 111,9 116,9 121,3 125,0 128,1 130,6 132,5 133,8 134,4 134,4 133,8 132,5 130,6 128,1 125,0 121,3 116,9 111,9 106,3 
 300  100,0 105,9 111,3 115,9 120,0 123,4 126,3 128,4 130,0 130,9 131,3 130,9 130,0 128,4 126,3 123,4 120,0 115,9 111,3 105,9 100,0 
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[[In the Public Good Game]]  
 
  Y                        
X    0  5  10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
 0  100,0 102,4 104,7 106,8 108,8 110,5 112,2 113,7 115,0 116,2 117,2 118,0 118,8 119,3 119,7 119,9 120,0 119,9 119,7 119,3 118,8 
 5  107,4 109,7 111,8 113,8 115,5 117,2 118,7 120,0 121,2 122,2 123,0 123,8 124,3 124,7 124,9 125,0 124,9 124,7 124,3 123,8 123,0 
 10  114,7 116,8 118,8 120,5 122,2 123,7 125,0 126,2 127,2 128,0 128,8 129,3 129,7 129,9 130,0 129,9 129,7 129,3 128,8 128,0 127,2 
 15  121,8 123,8 125,5 127,2 128,7 130,0 131,2 132,2 133,0 133,8 134,3 134,7 134,9 135,0 134,9 134,7 134,3 133,8 133,0 132,2 131,2 
 20  128,8 130,5 132,2 133,7 135,0 136,2 137,2 138,0 138,8 139,3 139,7 139,9 140,0 139,9 139,7 139,3 138,8 138,0 137,2 136,2 135,0 
 25  135,5 137,2 138,7 140,0 141,2 142,2 143,0 143,8 144,3 144,7 144,9 145,0 144,9 144,7 144,3 143,8 143,0 142,2 141,2 140,0 138,7 
 30  142,2 143,7 145,0 146,2 147,2 148,0 148,8 149,3 149,7 149,9 150,0 149,9 149,7 149,3 148,8 148,0 147,2 146,2 145,0 143,7 142,2 
 35  148,7 150,0 151,2 152,2 153,0 153,8 154,3 154,7 154,9 155,0 154,9 154,7 154,3 153,8 153,0 152,2 151,2 150,0 148,7 147,2 145,5 
 40  155,0 156,2 157,2 158,0 158,8 159,3 159,7 159,9 160,0 159,9 159,7 159,3 158,8 158,0 157,2 156,2 155,0 153,7 152,2 150,5 148,8 
 45  161,2 162,2 163,0 163,8 164,3 164,7 164,9 165,0 164,9 164,7 164,3 163,8 163,0 162,2 161,2 160,0 158,7 157,2 155,5 153,8 151,8 
 50  167,2 168,0 168,8 169,3 169,7 169,9 170,0 169,9 169,7 169,3 168,8 168,0 167,2 166,2 165,0 163,7 162,2 160,5 158,8 156,8 154,7 
 55  173,0 173,8 174,3 174,7 174,9 175,0 174,9 174,7 174,3 173,8 173,0 172,2 171,2 170,0 168,7 167,2 165,5 163,8 161,8 159,7 157,4 
 60  178,8 179,3 179,7 179,9 180,0 179,9 179,7 179,3 178,8 178,0 177,2 176,2 175,0 173,7 172,2 170,5 168,8 166,8 164,7 162,4 160,0 
 65  184,3 184,7 184,9 185,0 184,9 184,7 184,3 183,8 183,0 182,2 181,2 180,0 178,7 177,2 175,5 173,8 171,8 169,7 167,4 165,0 162,4 
 70  189,7 189,9 190,0 189,9 189,7 189,3 188,8 188,0 187,2 186,2 185,0 183,7 182,2 180,5 178,8 176,8 174,7 172,4 170,0 167,4 164,7 
 75  194,9 195,0 194,9 194,7 194,3 193,8 193,0 192,2 191,2 190,0 188,7 187,2 185,5 183,8 181,8 179,7 177,4 175,0 172,4 169,7 166,8 
 80  200,0 199,9 199,7 199,3 198,8 198,0 197,2 196,2 195,0 193,7 192,2 190,5 188,8 186,8 184,7 182,4 180,0 177,4 174,7 171,8 168,8 
 85  204,9 204,7 204,3 203,8 203,0 202,2 201,2 200,0 198,7 197,2 195,5 193,8 191,8 189,7 187,4 185,0 182,4 179,7 176,8 173,8 170,5 
 90  209,7 209,3 208,8 208,0 207,2 206,2 205,0 203,7 202,2 200,5 198,8 196,8 194,7 192,4 190,0 187,4 184,7 181,8 178,8 175,5 172,2 
 95  214,3 213,8 213,0 212,2 211,2 210,0 208,7 207,2 205,5 203,8 201,8 199,7 197,4 195,0 192,4 189,7 186,8 183,8 180,5 177,2 173,7 
 100  218,8 218,0 217,2 216,2 215,0 213,7 212,2 210,5 208,8 206,8 204,7 202,4 200,0 197,4 194,7 191,8 188,8 185,5 182,2 178,7 175,0 
 105  223,0 222,2 221,2 220,0 218,7 217,2 215,5 213,8 211,8 209,7 207,4 205,0 202,4 199,7 196,8 193,8 190,5 187,2 183,7 180,0 176,2 
 110  227,2 226,2 225,0 223,7 222,2 220,5 218,8 216,8 214,7 212,4 210,0 207,4 204,7 201,8 198,8 195,5 192,2 188,7 185,0 181,2 177,2 
 115  231,2 230,0 228,7 227,2 225,5 223,8 221,8 219,7 217,4 215,0 212,4 209,7 206,8 203,8 200,5 197,2 193,7 190,0 186,2 182,2 178,0 
 120  235,0 233,7 232,2 230,5 228,8 226,8 224,7 222,4 220,0 217,4 214,7 211,8 208,8 205,5 202,2 198,7 195,0 191,2 187,2 183,0 178,8 
 125  238,7 237,2 235,5 233,8 231,8 229,7 227,4 225,0 222,4 219,7 216,8 213,8 210,5 207,2 203,7 200,0 196,2 192,2 188,0 183,8 179,3 
 130  242,2 240,5 238,8 236,8 234,7 232,4 230,0 227,4 224,7 221,8 218,8 215,5 212,2 208,7 205,0 201,2 197,2 193,0 188,8 184,3 179,7 
 135  245,5 243,8 241,8 239,7 237,4 235,0 232,4 229,7 226,8 223,8 220,5 217,2 213,7 210,0 206,2 202,2 198,0 193,8 189,3 184,7 179,9 
 140  248,8 246,8 244,7 242,4 240,0 237,4 234,7 231,8 228,8 225,5 222,2 218,7 215,0 211,2 207,2 203,0 198,8 194,3 189,7 184,9 180,0 
 145  251,8 249,7 247,4 245,0 242,4 239,7 236,8 233,8 230,5 227,2 223,7 220,0 216,2 212,2 208,0 203,8 199,3 194,7 189,9 185,0 179,9 
 150  254,7 252,4 250,0 247,4 244,7 241,8 238,8 235,5 232,2 228,7 225,0 221,2 217,2 213,0 208,8 204,3 199,7 194,9 190,0 184,9 179,7 
 155  257,4 255,0 252,4 249,7 246,8 243,8 240,5 237,2 233,7 230,0 226,2 222,2 218,0 213,8 209,3 204,7 199,9 195,0 189,9 184,7 179,3 
 160  260,0 257,4 254,7 251,8 248,8 245,5 242,2 238,7 235,0 231,2 227,2 223,0 218,8 214,3 209,7 204,9 200,0 194,9 189,7 184,3 178,8 
 165  262,4 259,7 256,8 253,8 250,5 247,2 243,7 240,0 236,2 232,2 228,0 223,8 219,3 214,7 209,9 205,0 199,9 194,7 189,3 183,8 178,0 
 170  264,7 261,8 258,8 255,5 252,2 248,7 245,0 241,2 237,2 233,0 228,8 224,3 219,7 214,9 210,0 204,9 199,7 194,3 188,8 183,0 177,2 
 175  266,8 263,8 260,5 257,2 253,7 250,0 246,2 242,2 238,0 233,8 229,3 224,7 219,9 215,0 209,9 204,7 199,3 193,8 188,0 182,2 176,2 
 180  268,8 265,5 262,2 258,7 255,0 251,2 247,2 243,0 238,8 234,3 229,7 224,9 220,0 214,9 209,7 204,3 198,8 193,0 187,2 181,2 175,0 
 185  270,5 267,2 263,7 260,0 256,2 252,2 248,0 243,8 239,3 234,7 229,9 225,0 219,9 214,7 209,3 203,8 198,0 192,2 186,2 180,0 173,7 
 190  272,2 268,7 265,0 261,2 257,2 253,0 248,8 244,3 239,7 234,9 230,0 224,9 219,7 214,3 208,8 203,0 197,2 191,2 185,0 178,7 172,2 
 195  273,7 270,0 266,2 262,2 258,0 253,8 249,3 244,7 239,9 235,0 229,9 224,7 219,3 213,8 208,0 202,2 196,2 190,0 183,7 177,2 170,5 
 200  275,0 271,2 267,2 263,0 258,8 254,3 249,7 244,9 240,0 234,9 229,7 224,3 218,8 213,0 207,2 201,2 195,0 188,7 182,2 175,5 168,8 
 205  276,2 272,2 268,0 263,8 259,3 254,7 249,9 245,0 239,9 234,7 229,3 223,8 218,0 212,2 206,2 200,0 193,7 187,2 180,5 173,8 166,8 
 210  277,2 273,0 268,8 264,3 259,7 254,9 250,0 244,9 239,7 234,3 228,8 223,0 217,2 211,2 205,0 198,7 192,2 185,5 178,8 171,8 164,7 
 215  278,0 273,8 269,3 264,7 259,9 255,0 249,9 244,7 239,3 233,8 228,0 222,2 216,2 210,0 203,7 197,2 190,5 183,8 176,8 169,7 162,4 
 220  278,8 274,3 269,7 264,9 260,0 254,9 249,7 244,3 238,8 233,0 227,2 221,2 215,0 208,7 202,2 195,5 188,8 181,8 174,7 167,4 160,0 
 225  279,3 274,7 269,9 265,0 259,9 254,7 249,3 243,8 238,0 232,2 226,2 220,0 213,7 207,2 200,5 193,8 186,8 179,7 172,4 165,0 157,4 
 230  279,7 274,9 270,0 264,9 259,7 254,3 248,8 243,0 237,2 231,2 225,0 218,7 212,2 205,5 198,8 191,8 184,7 177,4 170,0 162,4 154,7 
 235  279,9 275,0 269,9 264,7 259,3 253,8 248,0 242,2 236,2 230,0 223,7 217,2 210,5 203,8 196,8 189,7 182,4 175,0 167,4 159,7 151,8 
 240  280,0 274,9 269,7 264,3 258,8 253,0 247,2 241,2 235,0 228,7 222,2 215,5 208,8 201,8 194,7 187,4 180,0 172,4 164,7 156,8 148,8 
 245  279,9 274,7 269,3 263,8 258,0 252,2 246,2 240,0 233,7 227,2 220,5 213,8 206,8 199,7 192,4 185,0 177,4 169,7 161,8 153,8 145,5 
 250  279,7 274,3 268,8 263,0 257,2 251,2 245,0 238,7 232,2 225,5 218,8 211,8 204,7 197,4 190,0 182,4 174,7 166,8 158,8 150,5 142,2 
 255  279,3 273,8 268,0 262,2 256,2 250,0 243,7 237,2 230,5 223,8 216,8 209,7 202,4 195,0 187,4 179,7 171,8 163,8 155,5 147,2 138,7 
 260  278,8 273,0 267,2 261,2 255,0 248,7 242,2 235,5 228,8 221,8 214,7 207,4 200,0 192,4 184,7 176,8 168,8 160,5 152,2 143,7 135,0 
 265  278,0 272,2 266,2 260,0 253,7 247,2 240,5 233,8 226,8 219,7 212,4 205,0 197,4 189,7 181,8 173,8 165,5 157,2 148,7 140,0 131,2 
 270  277,2 271,2 265,0 258,7 252,2 245,5 238,8 231,8 224,7 217,4 210,0 202,4 194,7 186,8 178,8 170,5 162,2 153,7 145,0 136,2 127,2 
 275  276,2 270,0 263,7 257,2 250,5 243,8 236,8 229,7 222,4 215,0 207,4 199,7 191,8 183,8 175,5 167,2 158,7 150,0 141,2 132,2 123,0 
 280  275,0 268,7 262,2 255,5 248,8 241,8 234,7 227,4 220,0 212,4 204,7 196,8 188,8 180,5 172,2 163,7 155,0 146,2 137,2 128,0 118,8 
 285  273,7 267,2 260,5 253,8 246,8 239,7 232,4 225,0 217,4 209,7 201,8 193,8 185,5 177,2 168,7 160,0 151,2 142,2 133,0 123,8 114,3 
 290  272,2 265,5 258,8 251,8 244,7 237,4 230,0 222,4 214,7 206,8 198,8 190,5 182,2 173,7 165,0 156,2 147,2 138,0 128,8 119,3 109,7 
 295  270,5 263,8 256,8 249,7 242,4 235,0 227,4 219,7 211,8 203,8 195,5 187,2 178,7 170,0 161,2 152,2 143,0 133,8 124,3 114,7 104,9 
 300  268,8 261,8 254,7 247,4 240,0 232,4 224,7 216,8 208,8 200,5 192,2 183,7 175,0 166,2 157,2 148,0 138,8 129,3 119,7 109,9 100,0 
 
 
[[In the Public Good Game]]  
 
  Your Total Payoffs  =  Your Account 1 Payoffs    + Your Account 2 Payoffs 
    =  [6*(Y+X)  -  0.0125*(Y+X)
2]*0.25  + (100-X) 
 
[[In the Common-Pool Resource Game]]  
 
  Your Total Payoffs  =  Your Account 1 Payoffs  + Your Account 2 Payoffs 
    =  [6  –  0.0125*(Y+X)]*X  + (100-X) 
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[[In both Games]]  
 
Where X is your investment decision in Account 1 and Y is the sum of the investments of the others in 
Account 1. 
 
Period by period information: You will not get information on the individual decisions of the other 
members of your group. In each period, after all participants have made their decisions you will get 
information on: (1) your own decision, (2) the sum of the decisions of the others, (3) your payoffs in 
Account 1, (4) your payoffs in Account 2, (5) the sum of the payoffs in Account 1 and Account 2, and 
(6) the cumulated payoffs throughout all the experiment. 
 
Payment: 100 Taler are worth 0.30 Euro. At the end of the experiment all your Taler will be converted 
to Euro and paid to you in cash. 
 
Please raise your hand if you have any remaining questions 
 
Thank you very much for your participation! 
 
 




1.  If you invest (insert the first value drawn here) Taler into Account 1, how many Taler do you then 
automatically invest in Account 2?  
 
2.  If you invest (insert the second value drawn here) Taler into Account 1, what is your profit from 
Account 2?  
 
3.  If you invest (insert the third value drawn here) Taler into Account 1 and the other three 
participants invest a total of (insert the fourth value drawn here) Taler into Account 1, what is your 
total profit?  
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